Philanthropy on the Blockchain by Jayasinghe, Danushka et al.
Philanthropy On The Blockchain
Danushka Jayasinghe, Sheila Cobourne, Konstantinos Markantonakis, Raja
Naeem Akram and Keith Mayes
Smart Card & IoT Security Centre, Information Security Group,
Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, Surrey, UK, TW20 0EX
{Danushka.Jayasinghe.2012, Sheila.Cobourne.2008}@live.rhul.ac.uk,
{K.Markantonakis, R.N.Akram, Keith.Mayes}@rhul.ac.uk
Abstract. One of the significant innovations that came out of Bitcoin is
the blockchain technology. This paper explores how the blockchain can
be leveraged in the philanthropic sector, through charitable donation
services in fiat currency or Bitcoin via a web-based donor platform. The
philanthropic model is then used for a case study providing humanitarian
aid for a community living in a challenging geographical environment
with limited internet availability. An SMS based mobile payment system
is proposed for provisioning the received donations using the existing
GSM network, very basic mobile phones and One Time Password (OTP)
security tokens. The proposed scheme is finally evaluated for security
while discussing the impact it has on charities and donors.
Keywords: Blockchain, Bitcoin, Rootstock, Philanthropy, Smart Contract,
Multi-signatures, Hosted Wallet, SMS, Charity, OTP, Security Token.
1 Introduction
Bitcoin is a decentralised cryptocurrency system which works on a peer-to-peer
network, using blockchain technology [8, 18]. Blockchain technology has gained
rapid interest due to its decentralised nature and strong security properties [22,
23]. However, blockchains are not limited to decentralised cryptocurrencies, but
can also be applied to other innovative ideas such as smart contracts, recording
asset ownerships, cross-border payment solutions, trade finance, etc. [21, 22].
A report by the UK Charities Aid Foundation [10] identifies that for chari-
ties, blockchains can increase transparency, openness and trust whilst reducing
transaction costs and providing new opportunities for fundraising. We explore
this by introducing a generic blockchain based philanthropic model that uses a
web-based donation platform where donors can choose which charity projects
to support, through donations in Bitcoin or fiat currency [17]. In the proposed
scheme, the charity will maintain hosted Bitcoin Wallets for registered users:
back-end payments are done via multi-signature Bitcoin transactions to enhance
security: more advanced services can be offered using Smart Contracts via the
Rootstock platform [2]. This allows the charity to provide feedback on how each
individual donation was used (donation transparency), along with secure, cheap
and speedy transactions and an infrastructure that can be used for donation
provisioning. This generic philanthropic model is then applied to financial aid
distribution in oﬄine geographical environments such as warzones, disaster ar-
eas and economically deprived areas of the world where the basic technologi-
cal infrastructure necessary for a blockchain solution is not available. In these
challenging conditions, conventional internet-based money transfer may not be
possible and physical cash handling may be fraught with danger. Using our so-
lution, Bitcoin payments can be done using basic mobile phones, an SMS mobile
payment system utilising an existing GSM network and low-cost security tokens.
The main contributions of the paper are: 1) a new philanthropic model that
leverages the Bitcoin blockchain/ Smart Contract Platform for charitable dona-
tions/ provisioning and 2) an SMS based Bitcoin mobile payment system that
can be used in an oﬄine environment. The paper is structured as follows. Benefits
of Blockchains are identified in Section 2. Our philanthropic model is introduced
in Section 3, and in Section 4, this is applied to a use case of humanitarian aid in
a disconnected environment. The proposed scheme is evaluated in Section 5, and
the discussion is concluded and future research directions outlined in Section 6.
2 Benefits of Blockchain Solutions for Charities/ Donors
Blockchain solutions can provide advantages when used in conjunction with char-
itable giving [10, 11, 15]. For example, the Royal National Lifeboat Institution
(RNLI) in the UK has accepted Bitcoin since August 2015 [7]. BitGive Foun-
dation’s (GiveTrack) allows donors to trace Bitcoin transactions (donations) in
real time [5] Bitcoin solutions can benefit both charities and donors as follows:
1. Donation transparency: by using Bitcoin addresses for donations there is a
publicly available audit trail detailing exactly where a particular donation went.
2. Reducing transaction costs: Low International transaction fees are a fea-
ture of blockchain payments as seen in Table 1. Bitcoin Currency (BTC), United
States Dollar (USD), Great British Pound (GBP).
Table 1. Comparison of transaction fees
Transaction Method Fee BTC Fee USD Fee GBP Speed
Bitcoin(average 645 bytes)a 0.0001 $0.25 £0.20 roughly 50 minutes [9]
Western Unionb - $14.83 £8.90 less then 1 hour
Western Unionb - $11.50 £6.90 next day
MoneyGramb - $16.50 £9.90 less then 1 hour
Riab - $10.00 £6.00 same day
a Bitcoin transaction fees are calculated on transaction size, not monetary value [8].
b Based on remittance transfer of 120 GBP from the United Kingdom to Uganda [20].
3. Donation speed: All Bitcoin transactions are broadcast immediately. Each
transaction that is included in a valid mined block and added to the blockchain
is called a confirmation which takes just over seven minutes [8, 9]. With each
subsequent block mined, the number of confirmations for that particular trans-
action increases by one. It is common practice to wait until at least six confirma-
tions [18], taking roughly fifty minutes [9]. Some transactions could be considered
to be complete after only one or two confirmations. This is fast compared to ex-
isting methods which could take several days [23]: see Table 1.
4. Donation provisioning: Provisioning the donations to beneficiaries can be
challenging. For example, humanitarian financial aid distribution in warzones
can be hindered if the country’s banking system is subject to sanctions. Bitcoin
payments bypass the banking system and donations can reach their intended
target, without requiring the charity to transport large amounts of cash [10].
3 The Blockchain Philanthropic Model
We propose a system where a donor can make their donation in Bitcoin via
a Donor Platform. Each charity/project on the donor platform has a Bitcoin
address, with the ‘granularity’ ranging from one Bitcoin address per project
through to a central Bitcoin address for the charity. These standalone Bitcoin ad-
dresses can be funded by donors using a standard pay to address (Pay To Public
Key Hash) Bitcoin transaction. Bitcoin donors can use any Bitcoin wallet/client
to donate, or use fiat currency that gets converted to Bitcoin automatically by
using an online exchange. Once a donation is made, the donor can query the
blockchain to see whether the donated funds have been used or not. The char-
ity then uses the donations to allocate financial aid to individual beneficiaries.
Beneficiaries can then perform Bitcoin transactions for day-to-day activities.
3.1 Bitcoin Transaction Methods
We propose that donations can be used by the charity for donation provision-
ing and subsequent SMS payment processing via one of two Bitcoin payment
methods: Multi-Signature Addresses and Smart Contracts.
Option 1: Multi-Signature Addresses are derived using a multi-signature
process, where more than one private key is needed to authorise a transaction.
For example, a 2-of-3 multi-signature is when a Bitcoin address is associated
with three private keys and at least two out of the three private keys are needed
to authorise a Bitcoin transaction. In our proposal, we use ‘Pay To Script Hash’
(P2SH) transactions to process multi-signatures. To generate a multi-signature,
a Full Redeem Script which includes details of the three public keys is hashed
to generate a hashed Redeem Script which becomes the P2SH multi-signature.
The Full Redeem Script is shared between all key-holding entities. The Redeem
Script can be used to verify the transferred amount and whether its being sent
to the correct multi-signature address. It also gives details about how many
signatures are needed to make a payment. The recipient needs to provide the
full redeem script to spend the received Bitcoins.
Option 2: Smart Contracts can be defined as a set of instructions repre-
sented in computer code published on a distributed network, that receives in-
puts, executes instructions and provides outputs. It can enable a charity to offer
additional features such as: routine provisioning of donations when beneficiaries
are low in cash, issuance of small micro-finance loans, record keeping, donation
requests to donors and automatic audit reports of a charity activity. Running
advanced smart contracts on the Bitcoin network is not possible, however, a
suitable platform would be Rootstock (RSK) [2], which is a sidechain that is
based on a 2-Way peg mechanism. The 2-Way peg is a method to convert BTC
into Smart Bitcoin Currency (SBTC) and vice-versa. When a user intends to
convert BTC to SBTC, some BTC are locked in Bitcoin and the same amount
of SBTC is unlocked in RSK and vice-versa [2]. Provisioning of donations, pay-
ments between beneficiaries and transaction fees to execute instructions are paid
using SBTC. The smart contract is then published in the RSK network i.e. the
contract exists on every node joining the network, including miners. To exe-
cute an instruction in the smart contract, the charity broadcasts a message to
the RSK network. A small transaction fee is paid for this process (“Gas”). A
smart contract can be instructed to receive two or more signatures (similar to
multi-signature functionality) via programmable logic before a transaction can
be executed and broadcast to the peer-to-peer network.
4 The Philanthropic Model in an Oﬄine Environment
Blockchain based schemes have constraints, such as requiring Internet and com-
patible devices: computers, tablets or smart phones that can perform crypto-
graphic processes. People in a geographical area without reliable Internet facil-
ity would find it difficult to use the hosted wallet based transactions. There is
more GSM network coverage than Internet access in most countries around the
world [16], and the use of mobile phones within the GSM network coverage is
considerably higher compared to other communication technologies [16], so this
points us to consider an Short Message Service (SMS)-based solution.
4.1 SMS Payments and Bitcoin
SMS m-payment systems have been extremely successful in the developing world,
most notably M-PESA in Kenya [6]. The SMS approach has been extended to
perform Bitcoin transactions [1,3]. However, all these schemes require the user
to have initial online access to set up and maintain their Wallet. Attempts to
integrate Bitcoin directly with M-PESA in Kenya have largely been unsuccessful
due to business pressures [24]. Other proposals need smartphone apps to interact
with online Bitcoin wallets e.g. BTC Wallet [12]. As none of these existing solu-
tions is suitable, we propose a novel SMS based mobile payment system which
acts as a gateway to transact with the blockchain, using Bitcoin wallets hosted
on beneficiaries’ behalf by the charity (Hosted Wallet). Oﬄine beneficiaries can
then make and receive Bitcoin payments using SMS messaging on basic mobile
phones along with a One Time Password (OTP) security token, that provides
some assurance that only a genuine user can send an SMS to make a transaction.
4.2 Security Requirements and Adversarial Model
The proposed scheme must satisfy the following security requirements. Confi-
dentiality: sensitive information should not be disclosed to unauthorised par-
ties. Integrity: information must not be tampered with by unauthorised parties.
Authentication: all participants in a transaction must be authorised and all
transaction data must be genuine. Non-repudiation: none of the participants
Fig. 1. Philanthropic Model and SMS Payment System Architecture
in a transaction can subsequently deny taking part in it. Availability: services
should not be denied to authorised users (distributed denial of service - DDoS).
In a humanitarian aid setting, the adversarial model is as follows [14]. State
Level Attackers (SL): high levels of skill/resources, employed by government
agencies to attack commercial/government systems. State sponsored cyber at-
tacks on humanitarian operations have been recorded. Cyber Criminals (CC):
are organised groups who attack systems for money, who also have high levels of
skill and resources. Hacktivists (Ha): have moderate skills and resources and
use digital tools to mount attacks for ideological reasons. Insiders (In): may
have low levels of technical skill and resources, corrupt users, charity workers or
merchants can be particularly dangerous if they have privileged access to data.
4.3 Proposed SMS-Based Bitcoin Payment Scheme
The charity creates Hosted Wallets for beneficiaries, and during a secure regis-
tration process at the local office, issues OTP tokens that will be used to make
payment requests. Our proposal involves interactions between a number of enti-
ties, described below: the relationship between entities is illustrated in Figure 1.
Bitcoin Payment Server (BPS): manages hosted Bitcoin Wallets on be-
half of beneficiaries, securely holds Bitcoin keys for each account holder and
is connected to the Bitcoin/RSK peer-to-peer network. Charity Local Office
(LO): located at the disconnected environment, registers phone numbers of users
and manages distribution of OTP tokens. Charity Head Quarters (HQ):
geographically distant from the aid environment, and has online access/secure
servers: the HQ holds relevant Bitcoin private keys for all payers. Charity Head
Quarters Backup Server (HQB): backup server which also holds relevant
Bitcoin private keys for all payers. One Time Password (OTP) Token: cheap
Hash-based One Time Password (HOTP) security token used with every SMS
transaction. SMS-Gateway: server that sends and receives SMS transmissions1
to and from the telecommunication network, and is connected to the BPS. Addi-
tionally, we make the following assumptions: Charity Head Quarters (HQ):
The charity operates on an international level while providing humanitarian aid
for oﬄine beneficiaries. It is a reputable and trusted entity, with secure premises
and online access/ backup servers which may be geographically distant from the
aid environment. Donors: Potential donors must have online access to use the
donor platform. Donor Platform: Hosted on a secure web server adhering to
industrial standard security controls to prevent attacks (such as: Denial of Ser-
vice, website defacing, content manipulation, etc.). Bitcoin Payment Server
(BPS): Secure server managed under industrial standard security controls to
prevent attacks. All security keys are kept encrypted and stored securely to min-
imise the risk of data breaches. Phones: All users of the system possess sim-
ple mobile phones (‘feature phones’) that are protected by security code/access
PINs, and the local existing GSM network can be used for SMS messages. Se-
cure Registration: At the LO, all users of the system must register their mobile
numbers and be issued with cheap Hash-based One Time Password (HOTP) se-
curity tokens. Mobile numbers are assigned an OTP identifier and Bitcoin wallet.
All registration details are sent to the BPS (encrypted using the LO’s private
key), in batches if the LO’s internet connection is intermittent
Security Token: This is a cheap hardware security token that generates HMAC-
Based (HOTP) passcodes when the user requests (“event-driven”). These codes
remain valid until used by the authenticating application. Typical OTP lengths
are 8 digits or 6 alphanumeric characters, and are generated by standardised
algorithms e.g RFC4226 [19]. The BPS can generate a user’s transaction OTP
using the same algorithm. Trust: SMS-Gateway and BPS are trusted & secure.
Mobile phones are not. Bitcoin wallet addresses: All the Bitcoin wallet ad-
dresses and Bitcoin transactions use a 2-of-3 multi-signature process. The key
holding entities are the BPS, charity HQ and HQB. So when the BPS receives a
payment request, it cannot broadcast a valid Bitcoin transaction to the Bitcoin
peer-to-peer network without it being authorised by one of the other keyholders.
4.4 Processing a Bitcoin Payment Request
Payments can be made from charity worker to beneficiary, beneficiary to mer-
chant, or merchant to merchant 2 , and the message flow is shown in Figure 2.
The notation used is shown in Table 2, security credentials for each entity are
shown in Table 3 and the content of each SMS messages used is shown in Ta-
ble 4. For simplicity of exposition, the following description shows the Head
Office (HQ) providing the second Bitcoin key.
1 All SMS messages used in the proposal are within the standard 160 character length.
2 Merchants could use an existing Bitcoin address, registered and associated with a
short Merchant ID by the BPS, used instead of PhP / PhR in transactions.
Fig. 2. SMS Payment Message Flow
Table 2. Notation used in Proposed SMS Payment Scheme
Notation Description
AddrX Bitcoin Multi-signature Address for entity X
BPS / PhX Bitcoin Payment Server(entity) Phone Number of entity X
BALX Bitcoin balance in Account ACX for entity X
EK(Z) / X→Y Encryption of data Z with key K / Message sent from X to Y
HQ / HQB Head Quarters (entity) / Head Quarters Backup Location (entity)
LO / P / R Local Office (entity) / Payer(entity) / Recipient(entity)
OTPX One Time Password generated by entity X
PKX/ SKX Public/ Secret Key pair of entity X
SX / TrHash Bitcoin Private Key of entity X (signing key) / Transaction Hash
TrAmt / TrNo Transaction Amount / Transaction Number
TXID Unique Transaction ID of a transaction recorded in the blockchain. Also
referred to as the Transaction Hash (TrHash)
(Z)SignK Signature on data Z with signature key K
TrFee Transaction Fee paid to the Bitcoin miner
RawTr Raw Transaction created for signing
ParTr Partial Signed Transaction created after signing RawTr
ComTr Complete Signed Transaction created after signing ParTr
ReSc Full Redeem Script used for the Bitcoin multi-signature address
RSKHash Rootstock Transaction Hash
RSK-AddSC RSK Smart Contract Address, unique for the contract and never changes
RSK-AddX−Y RSK public key (RSK address) of entity X kept securely with entity Y
SRSK−X−Y RSK private key of entity X kept securely with entity Y
Gas Transaction fee paid to execute instructions on the smart contract
Stage 1: Payment Request: to make a payment, the Payer (P) types an
SMS with payment instructions (PayReq SMS ), and sends it to a local phone
number provided by the charity, to be forwarded to the charity’s BPS via the
SMS-Gateway. The BPS retrieves Bitcoin wallets for both Payer and Recipient,
checks TrAmt is not greater than BALP , pseudo-randomly generates a three-
digit number, unique per transaction TrNo, and then sends AuthReq SMS asking
for Payer’s OTP. The Payer presses a button on the OTP token, then sends Auth
SMS containing the resulting OTP to authorise the transaction. The BPS checks
the TrNo, generates OTPBPS and compares to the received OTPP . If any checks
fail, TransDenied SMS is sent to the Payer. If all checks are passed then the BPS
proceeds to making a Bitcoin payment, using one of the two proposed options.
Stage 2: Bitcoin Transaction Processing
Option 1: Multi-signature Process: The BPS first generates a Raw Trans-
action (RawTr) which includes the Full Redeem Script (ReSc), the new multi-
signature address associated for the receiver where the payment is going to,
TrAmt and TrFee. The RawTr then needs to be signed by minimum 2 partic-
ipants in turn to generate a valid Bitcoin transaction. The BPS first signs the
RawTr using the corresponding Payer private key SP and forwards the Partial
Signed Transaction (ParTr) to the HQ for signing.
BPS→HQ: ParTr = (ReSc,AddrR,TrAmt,TrFee)SignSP
To authorise the payment request, HQ first verifies the ParTr to check the
payment amount and number of signatures needed. Once satisfied, HQ signs
this using its private payer Bitcoin key SP−HQ to generate the Complete Signed
Transaction ComTr and sends this back to the BPS.
HQ→BPS: ComTr =(ParTr)SignSP−HQ
The BPS then broadcasts the ComTr to the Bitcoin peer-to-peer network. Once
broadcast, a unique transaction-id (TXID) or the recipient’s Bitcoin address
can be used to trace the transaction on the blockchain. The Bitcoin miner who
first publishes the valid block in the blockchain that also includes our Bitcoin
transaction is paid the TrFee for the payment. This is the first confirmation for
the transaction. The BPS then waits for the transaction to be confirmed in the
agreed number of blocks before generating the SMSs.
Option 2: Smart Contract Process: The BPS calls the Smart Contract and
authorises the TrAmt and the Gas is paid by using the SRSK−P−BPS .
BPS→RSK: RSK-AddSC ,RSK-AddP ,RSK-AddR,TrAmt,Gas
Once the message gets broadcast in the RSK network, the HQ or the HQB calls
the smart contract which act as the second set of instructions needed by the
smart contract to execute the transaction. HQ/HQB uses the SRSK−P−HQ/HQB
to authorise the paid amount TrAmt and the transaction fee Gas.
HQ/HQB→RSK: RSK-AddSC ,RSK-AddP−HQ,RSK-AddR,TrAmt,Gas
Table 3. Credentials Used in Proposed SMS Payment Scheme
Entity Keys and Other Assets
Payer/ Recipient No keys, PIN for phone, HOTP token (no PIN) for making payments
BPS SP−BPS ,AddrP−BPS , AddrR−BPS , PKLO, PhX , OTPX
HQ SP−HQ, SRSK−HQ, ReSc
HQB SP−HQB , SRSK−HQB , ReSc
LO SKLO, Physical OTP tokens, phone numbers (payers/recipients), plus
registration details/ OTP allocation details
Donor SDonor/ VDonor
Donor Platform AddrProject
Table 4. SMS Payment Messages
Message Content
PayReq SMS PhP , TrAmt, PhR
AuthReq SMS TrNo, AuthReq
Auth SMS PhP , TrNo,OTPP
TransDenied SMS PhP , TrNo, PhR, Denied
PayConf SMS TrNo,TrAmt, PhR, BALP , TXID
RecConf SMS TrNo,TrAmt, PhP , BALR, TXID
PayConfRSK SMS TrNo,TrAmt, PhR, BALP , RskHash
RecConfRSK SMS TrNo,TrAmt, PhP , BALR, RskHash
When instructions are received from both BPS and HQ/HQB, the Smart Con-
tract executes a transaction to transfer the value TrAmt to the recipient. The
unique transaction details are recorded instantly on the RSK blockchain in the
format of a hash (RskHash). The BPS does not need to wait for a transaction
confirmation as there is instant confirmation when using the RSK platform.
Stage 3: Payment Finalisation: Once the payment is done, the BPS up-
dates the payer/recipient balances and sends confirmation messages via the SMS-
Gateway: PayConf SMS or PayConfRSK SMS to the Payer and RecConf SMS
or RecConfRSK SMS to the Recipient. TXID/RskHash are included as unique
IDs that can be used to trace the transaction on the Bitcoin/RSK blockchains.
5 Analysis
In this section, we discuss SMS security and analyse the proposal against secu-
rity requirements shown in Section 4.2. A summary of targets that adversaries
may attack along with suggested countermeasures is shown in Table 5.
SMS Security Issues: SMS messages are not encrypted by default and the
SMS service is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks and spoofing [4]. Attack
methods include interception/redirection using false base stations in GSM net-
works, eavesdropping at the Short Message Service Centre (SMSC), and SS7
hacking [13]. Adversaries who might target the SMS system are SL, CC and
In, aiming to create fraudulent transactions. Although these issues are not ad-
dressed directly in our proposal, measures have been included which provide
some deterrent to would-be attackers. The use of the OTP means that replay
Table 5. Attack Targets, Adversaries and Countermeasures
Target SL CCHa In Countermeasure
Donor Platform y y y Hosted on a secure web server adhering to indus-
trial standard security controls to defend against
: DDoS, website defacing, content manipulation
HQ/HQB/BPS
(DDoS)
y y HQ/HQB has secure premises and backup servers:
BPS managed under industrial standard security
controls and best practices to prevent attacks.
HQ/HQB/BPS
(privilege esca-
lation)
y y y Use of security controls such as: access con-
trol, routine web-application vulnerability assess-
ment/patching and storing keys encrypted
SMS
(MNO/GSM)
y y GSM/SMS security issues partially mitigated by
OTP 2FA and TXID/RSKhash on confirmations
SMS spoof y y y OTP/TXID/RSKhash gives some assurance that
payment is genuine
SMS replay y y y OTP prevents replay attacks
Blockchain/RSK
(DDoS)
y y DDoS attacks not viable in distributed ledger, and
integrity is innate in blockchain solutions
attacks will fail, and the AuthReq SMS from the charity should alert users to
potentially fraudulent transactions. Additional assurance comes from including
both TXID/RSKHash and TrNo in confirmation SMSs: these can be used to
cross check with the Bitcoin/RSK blockchain and in a verbal comparison be-
tween Payer and Recipient respectively, to provide an extra level of assurance
that the transaction is correct. These measures provide a higher level of security
than other SMS Bitcoin schemes: e.g. in Coinapult SMS, the user sends an SMS
containing a security code sent by the payment service in a previous SMS, which
offers limited assurance that the transaction is genuine.
Security Requirements
Confidentiality- Security of Bitcoin private keys: If a Bitcoin private key
or Bitcoin wallet is lost or not accessible, then the Bitcoin value recorded to that
Bitcoin address cannot be transferred. The 2-of-3 multi-signature process avoids
this risk by allowing any two out of the three private key holders to recover the
Bitcoins. Donor anonymity: Anonymous donations may introduce manage-
ment issues for the charity, as this may need special reporting and investigation
due to possible money laundering/fraud regulations. To comply with these, a
charity policy may be needed requiring identification for donations over a cer-
tain amount. Server attacks (HQ/HQB/BPS): Adversaries SL and CC will
aim at obtaining keys, transaction data and identity information: Ha may wish
to find embarrassing data. Table 5 shows recommended countermeasures.
Integrity- Blockchain ensures the integrity by providing an immutable record
of past transactions. RSK blockchain is mined by the same miners in the Bit-
coin peer to peer network. Double-spending prevented by using proof-of-work
using SHA256 hashing similar to Bitcoin and uses a checkpointing service pro-
vided by a federation of well-known and respected Bitcoin community mem-
bers [2]. Server attacks(HQ/HQB/BPS/Donor Platform): the donation
platform may be targeted by: CC to change published content by replacing the
charity’s Bitcoin addresses with addresses belonging to the criminals; Ha may
aim to vandalise the content; SL may tamper with it to undermine the credibility
of the charity. Transaction records at the BPS may be tampered with by CC,
SL to make fraudulent transactions. SMS Replay Attacks: countered using
the OTP in the SMSAuth message. Potential attackers here are SL, CC and In.
Authentication-Authenticating the payment request SMS: OTP security
tokens are used for two-factor authentication. The charity’s BPS authenticates
the user by verifying the OTP included in the SMS, so if a phone is lost/stolen,
an attacker cannot make a valid transaction. The OTP is valid until it is received
and processed by the BPS, so network delays will not cause adverse effects. This
should give some protection against spoofing attacks by adversaries Sl, CC and
In. Mobile Phones: The handset’s PIN protection will present a barrier to
attackers who steal the phone. Transaction Number: In a point-of-sale trans-
action, the beneficiary and the merchant can compare the TrNo received on
confirmation messages before a purchased product is handed out. Social engi-
neering: Aimed at obtaining privileged access to data at HQ/BPS, so security
awareness training will be needed. However, an insider at the BPS/HQ/HQB is
not able to transmit a transaction alone because of the use of multi-signatures.
Availability- Recovering lost Bitcoins: If any one of the three Bitcoin pri-
vate key holders loses their key the remaining two parties can recover the Bit-
coins. DDoS Attacks: The donor platform, HQ/HQB and BPS are an attrac-
tive targets for SL, Ha DDoS attacks: see Table 5 for countermeasures. DDOS on
the blockchain are not viable due to its innate security and distributed nature.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
This paper first identified the advantages of blockchains for charities, then dis-
cussed how blockchain solutions could be employed, even with their potential
constraints. The first contribution is a new philanthropic model that leverages
the Bitcoin blockchain. The payment system uses either a 2-of-3 multi-signature
transaction process with the Bitcoin network, or a smart contract for advanced
functionality utilising the RSK network. The second contribution is an SMS
Bitcoin payment system that can be used in an oﬄine environment via the
existing GSM network. This proposal was then evaluated against security re-
quirements. It must be noted that, the volatility of Bitcoin exchange value poses
a financial risk for the charity. However, in an environment where the banking
system/economy may have collapsed, using Bitcoin might be the only viable
option. Our solution is aimed at a closed eco-system where payments are made
within a constrained geographical environment, thus minimising the effects of
Bitcoin price volatility. As a long-term solution to this, the charity may replace
the Bitcoin blockchain with a private blockchain solution to give more control
over exchange prices. Other future work include a practical implementation of
the proposed scheme to identify potential limitations and take timing measure-
ments. Also, we would like to investigate how the philanthropic model could be
applied in different situations e.g. when smartphones and Internet connectivity
are available or in an ad-hoc network that replaces the existing GSM network.
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